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ABSTRACT: 
 
The Asian (Japanese) Lean production methods won considerable acclaim with the 
advent of the book “The Machine That Changed the World” by Womack, Jones and 
Roos. Design for Manufacture and Assembly (DFMA) is a Lean tool aimed at reducing 
the parts usage and assembly time of the product. It is said that the two principles are 
connected, and that Asian automobile manufacturers are well versed in this tool. It 
should be possible to test this claim by comparing the service time and parts data of 
altogether twelve Asian, North American and European cars, on the basis of collision 
insurance data from 1990-1991.  
 
This thesis will attempt to answer three questions: will Asian cars be Leaner in design 
than North American and European; will the cars’ results be so close for different 
companies in the same region that something can be said about the region’s expertise? 
And what cars will come out on top and bottom in the test? The analysis involves 
performing Chi squared tests on the significance of region in using “Lean” assemblies, 
and visual and qualitative evaluation of the test data.  
 
The results are ambiguous. While the Asian producers show strength in reduced service 
times – significantly so – the parts count, on the other hand, is dominated by the North 
American producers. That analysis, however, shows low – if any – statistical 
significance. Regional cohesion is furthermore visible in service times, not in parts 
count. Finally, the comparison shows Hyundai Sonata and Ford Taurus heading the 
service time and parts evaluations, respectively, with Saab 900 and Honda Accord 
trailing at the other end of the spectrum. The significance of this is unclear: a broader 
data analysis seems necessary. 
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ABSTRAKT: 
 
Den asiatiska (japanska) produktionsmetodiken vann stor framgång i och med boken 
“The Machine That Changed the World” av Womack, Jones och Roos. Design for 
Manufacture and Assembly (DFMA) är ett verktyg inom Lean (avskalad) produktion 
som strävar till att reducera en produkts komponentanvändning och monteringstid. Det 
sägs att de två produktionsfilosofierna är förenade på många punkter, och att de 
asiatiska bilproducenterna är kunniga i användningen av också detta verktyg. Det borde 
vara möjligt att pröva detta påstående genom att jämföra data över reparationstider och 
komponentanvändning i allt som allt tolv asiatiska, nordamerikanska och europeiska 
bilar, på basen av kollisionsförsäkringsdata från 1990-1991. 
 
Denna avhandlig kommer att försöka finna svaren till tre frågor: kommer de asiatiska 
bilarna att vara mera Lean i sin design än de nordamerikanska och de europeiska; 
kommer resultaten för olika företags bilar i samma region att var tillräckligt nära för att 
någonting ska kunna sägas om hela regionens kunnande? Och vilka bilar kommer att 
visa störst och minst användning av Lean -principer is sin design? Analysen består av 
Chi-kvadrattest på produktionsregionens signifikans för användningen av Lean, samt 
visuell och kvalitativ utvärdering av testdata. 
 
Resultaten är mångtydiga. Medan de asiatiska producenterna visar sin styrka i 
reducerade reparationstider – till en statistiskt signifikant grad – domineras 
komponentanvändningsanalysen av de amerikanska företagen. Den analysen, å andra 
sidan, visar en låg grad av statistisk signifikans. Dessutom är den regionala 
sammanhållningen bara tydlig i reparationstidsanalysen, inte i komponentanvändningen. 
Slutligen visar jämförelsen att Hyundai Sonata och Ford Taurus leder respektive klass, 
med Saab 900 and Honda Accord i andra änden av skalan. Betydelsen av allt detta är 
oklar: en forstsatt, djupare analys tycks nödvändig. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Ever since the days the industrial revolution, the slogan of the industrial world 
has been efficiency. Waste not, want not – the idea that has brought us 
historically unparalleled standards of living, and given rise to the 
computerised/industrialised society of today. Frederick Winslow Taylor with 
his well-known studies of production management, and Henry Ford with his 
mass production visions paved the road for the generations of efficient 
production management that would follow and build on the concept. The 
Western world bloomed under these ideas.  
 
But only the Western world? No, the same ideas were eventually adopted by 
the East, where, with an absolute grasp of effectiveness, even the theory of 
efficiency was made more efficient. The history of production development 
does a geographical jump at this time, with the rise of such groundbreaking 
concepts as the Toyota Production System and Just-in-Time production – and 
the advent of Lean production thinking.  
 
Lean production – today a broad concept that encompasses thousands of 
different ways to reach the goal of effective, non-waste production. Lean 
thinking is not static, nor is it the same thing as the Toyota Production System; 
it is a way of thinking that has grown and absorbed new theories and tools to 
stay up-to-date, and as such kept its importance in production management 
undiminished for many decades.  
 
Toyota and the other Asian car manufacturers are still very good at thinking 
Lean though. In The Machine That Changed the World – the international best-
seller production management book – authors James Womack, Daniel Jones, 
and Daniel Roos showed that Toyota and the Asian car manaufacturers 
produce cars more efficiently than their North American and European 
counterparts, and the reason: their all-encompassing way of making their 
company think and act Lean. Whether or not this is true is debatable, but the 
the Asian production figures speak for themselves (and have been doing so for 
a long time). This work is a part of that debate – checking the link between 
Asian car manufacturers’ Lean thinking and the concept of Lean design, and 
Design for Manufacture and Assembly.  
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Design for Manufacture and Assembly (or Design for Manufacture and Design 
for Assembly) are concepts that lie at the base of Lean design. Making a product 
using fewer and simpler parts (Design for Manufacture) and making a product 
that requires fewer assembly operations (Design for Assembly) is a basic step in 
eliminating process and material waste; a Lean production tool. So basic that it 
should be standard practise in every truly Lean company, right? 
 
That is the question. The aim of this work will be to study the Lean-ness of car 
design: based on objective service time and parts data that insurance companies 
use to estimate collision damage costs, it should be possible to see whether 
some cars are more sparing in their use of parts, and less time-consuming to 
service (a proxy for assembly time efficiency).  
 
While this will almost certainly the be case, the point of interest in this data will 
rather be this: will Asian cars be Leaner in design, considering their expertise in 
the field of Lean production? Will the cars’ results be so close for different 
companies in the same region that something can be said about the region’s 
expertise? And what cars will in fact come out on top and bottom in the test? 
The answers to these questions will hopefully be provided by comparison and 
suitable analysis of the data. 
 
The structure of the work will be simple – chapter two will give more 
background to Lean production: history, key points and development over 
time. Also the theory around Design for Manufacture and Design for Assembly 
will be elaborated upon, and finally some thoughts around the Asian success in 
Lean production will be discussed. Chapter three, in turn, will contain the data 
collection and analysis, detailing what methods were used to perform the data 
and analysis tool selection. The final chapter will cap off the work with 
discussion on the accuracy and validity of the results, and state any conclusions 
that can be made from the analysis.  
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 2. THE LEAN CONCEPT AND CAR 
In this section we acquaint ourselves with the theory behind the research: the 
origins of Lean Production, through the Toyota Production System to the 
eventual internationalisation and spread of the Lean concept. After this, a brief 
summary of the design tool Design for Manufacture and Assembly (DFMA), 
and its relevancy to Lean design, capped off by a more in-depth look at the 
regional aspects of Lean success. The aim of this section is to provide the basis 
for the assumptions we make before starting the data analysis; that the Asian 
car manufacturers show mastery of Lean production and that Lean production 
excellence is closely linked with proficiency in DFMA. 
2.1. The history and development of Lean thinking 
 
The beginning 
 
The first steps on the path to Lean production were taken with the advent of 
mass production in the automotive sector: Ford Motor Company under the 
leadership of Henry Ford. The 1908 model T-Ford was the result of several 
ground-breaking innovations. Womack, Jones and Roos (1990: 26-38) start their 
own illustration of the history of Lean by pinpointing that the most major 
strength of the mass production system was not the famous assembly line itself 
(even though that certainly made a huge difference from former tradition) but 
rather the complete inter-changeability of the parts themselves, and the easy 
way they could be assembled. This meant a clear step away from the crafts-
based production methods prevalent at the time, where almost all car 
components had to be machined and fitted individually; making each car more 
or less unique.   
 
Ford’s further improvements to the process – delivering all parts of a car to the 
assembly station in advance, making each worker responsible for a single task 
(the most time-saving change) and moving the car instead of the worker – were 
tangible advances that proved the basis for vast success, but everything builds 
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on the interchangeable parts concept (Womack et al 1990: 27-28). Combined, 
these best practices of their time were enough to boost Ford Motor Company 
past anything the other automotive companies could achieve. In 1913 the Model 
T production began at Ford's famous Highland Park, Michigan, improving 
chassis assembly speed from 12 hours and eight minutes to one hour and 33 
minutes (Ford 2008). In 1914, Ford produced 308,162 cars, more than all other 
automakers combined. And production would continue with only very minor 
modifications until the mid-twenties when production was halted in 1927. After 
having produced more than 15 million units, that is (Ford 2008).  
 
The best production practises of Ford Motor Co. (and the best business 
organisation practises of General Motors under Alfred Sloan, see Womack at al 
(1990: 39-43)) were to become the blueprint for success in the automotive 
industry during the following decades. The production system was copied 
without greater alterations in Europe, before and after the Second World War. It 
is at this point in time that the Japanese paradigm change gets its first humble 
beginnings in Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, Ltd, under the owner Sakichi 
Toyoda’s son Kiichiro Toyoda.  Kiichiro, who has visited the Ford Plants in 
1929, was to become the first leader of the Automobile Department of Toyoda 
Automatic Loom Works (Toyota 2008). Kiichiro Toyoda had seen that 
automobile production was the way to go, but, had also seen that the mass 
production practises of Ford Motor Company and the other Western producers 
were not the way to go.  
 
The Japanese business climate of the time and the financial situation of the 
company itself did not easily lend themselves to mass production – a small 
domestic market, a “proud” workforce unsuitable for tedious work and cyclical 
recruitment practises, no available “guest workers”, a lack of Japanese capital 
and an abundance of aggressive foreign firms ready to move in on the Japanese 
markets (Womack 1990: 49-50). Because of this, new solutions had to be found. 
Lean solutions, in fact. 
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The Toyota Production System  
 
And this is where it all began at Toyota (renamed so in 1936)(Toyota 2008). 
During a depression in the late 1940:s Toyota faced economic hardships and 
labour strikes, a situation that did not resolve until Kiichiro Toyoda resigned in 
favour of his nephew Eiji Toyoda. (Womack et al 1980: 48-49) Eiji, together with 
his today famous production engineer Taiichi Ohno, concluded that to reach 
success in the automotive industry Toyota would have to do things in a 
significantly different way from its competitors; partially because of social and 
financial constraints, partially because there could be winnings to be made from 
new approaches (Holweg 2006: 422). 
 
Taiichi Ohno correctly gauged the depth of the company’s money coffers and 
concluded that they could not afford to buy hundreds of metal stamping 
machines to produce the components of the car’s steel structure in the same 
way that Ford did. Instead Ohno decided to focus on a few different machines 
but make sure that the stamping dies (stamping templates) were easy to 
change. (Womack et al 1990: 52-53.) This to correct the two flaws he perceived 
in the Ford production system: a) by using big production batches large 
inventories build up, with a high number of defects and b) there is no room for 
product diversity (Holweg 2006: 422). The perfection of this small-batch system 
– eventually resulting in the Single-Minute-Exchange-of-Die program much 
later – led to the revolutionary discovery of a sort of reverse economies-of-scale, 
a Leaner production system. 
 
On the shop-floor level, one of the first and most innovative changes 
implemented to the production norm, was the ability of any worker to halt the 
production line to avoid lapses in quality to propagate down the line, where 
correcting the mistake would be more costly and time-consuming (Womack et 
al 1990: 55-57). While this custom resulted in many stops in the beginning, the 
long run result was a smoother production line where initial problems had been 
closely pinpointed and eliminated. The workers were also introduced to the 
concept of quality control circles (QC circles), where they could and should 
discuss process development in a group, thus including the workers in the day-
to-day decision-making of the production plant. This led to many gradual, 
small-scale improvement suggestions being brought forward and implemented, 
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achieving what we know today as continuous improvement (or Kaizen), a hot 
tool within Lean production (Monden 1983: 126-130). 
 
These few changes eventually established the base of Toyota’s success, but the 
Toyota Production system spans much more.  In figure 1, we can see a sketch of 
the different focus areas and production tools that make up the somewhat more 
modern Toyota Production System (Monden 1983: 3) These are numerous and 
each deserves a fair explanation, but the original book by Yasuhiro Monden is 
absolutely best for this task (see also Ohno, Taiichi (1995), Toyota Production 
System: Beyond Large-scale Production and Shingo, Shigeo (1989) A Study of the 
Toyota Production System from an Industrial Engineering Viewpoint) However, a 
few points on this chart are interesting enough to elaborate on. 
 
First of all, we can see that the basis for this process is put as “Improvement 
activities by small groups” – that is, continuous improvement. This is apparent in 
many of the middle activities, which are based heavily on the whole-hearted 
participation and motivation of the workers. How this motivation is achieved is 
debated – some say that the reasons are relatively culture specific or even 
enforced (life-time employment and a seniority based wage system in the 
former case, peer pressure and shaming in the latter (Womack 1990: 53-53; 
Bornfelt 2008; Kimura 1998). But the fact of the matter is that Lean principles 
have been successfully moved to other countries, and motivation sought by 
straight-forward methods: by inspiring company and product pride, instilling 
team spirit and offering monetary rewards (Monden 1983: 126-130; Womack 
1990: 79-80). 
 
Secondly, standardisation of work. This not only in on the shop floor, but in the 
management and product development structures too – the Toyota production 
system strives to standardize product design, processes and skills. Design 
standards are sought by extensive usage of development checklists, and 
parameter-led development. Simple tools, but surprisingly effective. Skill 
standardisation is sought through intensive basic training, not for reasons of 
interchangeability, but rather to smooth out the flow of communication. This is 
only a part of the story, since Toyota is also said to encourage worker to 
develop “towering knowledge” in their field (Morgan & Liker 2006: 169-174) 
but  
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Figure 1. Focus areas and production tools of the Toyota Production System 
(Monden 1983: 3). 
 
  
12 
 
 
the common skills that are needed to successfully work projects together – 
understanding of sales-related work, the ability to write technical reports in the  
standardised format, etc. – are necessary for the fast-paced product 
development and manufacturing practises of the Toyota Production System 
(Morgan & Liker 2006: 100-113). 
 
The next link is visual management. In Monden’s chart, this is perhaps best 
embodied by the Kanban system. Kanban – the system of cards and “shopping 
carts” that induces the production to order/shop their parts from the previous 
section of production, where these parts are made on demand. This allows the 
system to implement the switch from push production to pull (Monden 1983: 
14-28). This is of course a terribly shallow way to describe the phenomenon, but 
better explanations are available in abundance elsewhere, in other works. But 
the fact remains that visual, simple production management tools have shown 
themselves to be a very dependable way to guide the production, and the 
Kanban system itself has resulted in many positive effects; reduction of 
unnecessary inventory, identification of bottlenecks and the shortening of lead 
times are only a few of the examples (Monden 1983: 34).  
 
This leads us neatly to the next concept, Just-In-Time production and the 
establishment of Takt-time in the production flow. Just-In-Time production 
means just that: that parts are used when they are needed, and that there 
should be no need for expensive inventory of components, nor of finished 
products (Shingo 1984: 92). By stripping away the safety-net of intermediate 
warehouses and inventory, all flaws and kinks in the production line are cruelly 
exposed. However, when these are eventually straightened out, true flow 
becomes possible (Womack 1990: 54-55).  To further this flow, the Takt-time 
concept was introduced. The Japanese Takt-time has its roots in studies of a 
German Focke-Wulf aircraft plant, and the German “Produktionstakt” (Holweg 
2006: 421). This was one of Taiichi Ohno’s most long-term visions, one that he 
energetically worked to implement for the better part of twenty years – by 
making all assembly sub-stations work towards completing their work cycle in 
sync with the Takt-time, the whole production plant would eventually be able 
to flow to one beat. This system of course required considerable adjustments: a 
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very flexible and multi-skilled workforce, that was willing to accept changes in 
their routines and workplace, coupled with the implementation of flexible work 
cells with room for more workers.  
 
Taiichi Ohno is said to have considered Just-In-Time production one of the two 
legs upon which Toyota built its success. The other was their successful use of 
automated production. There is some debate over where the Toyota Production 
System stands on the workforce size issue – some say that the system suggests 
lay-offs due to automation and effectivization are inevitable and not unwanted, 
while yet others say that Toyota as a company has always preferred workers to 
machines due to their greater flexibility in terms of workplace arrangement and 
capital tie-down (Womack 1990: 102; Bornfelt 2008;). “Autonomation” is 
nevertheless an important aspect of the Toyota Production System. 
Autonomation, because the automation is not supposed to be unthinking – 
rather it should actively, constantly check its own results, and alert the workers 
whenever an error arises, thus freeing the worker to focus only on the 
abnormal, where his skills are necessary, and not on the standard, every-day 
issues. (Shingo 1984: 93-95). This may sound commonplace today, but the great 
degree of automatic handling of parts and materials that Toyota adopted, was – 
at the time they started to achieve their fame in the world – very radical.   
 
Returning to Monden’s chart in figure one, we can see that what remains at the 
top is the target of the improvement flow: “Profit increase under slow growing 
economy” by “Cost reduction by eliminating waste”. The hunt for waste, or muda 
in Japanese, is often said to be the final aim and identification tag of all Lean 
activities. The Toyota Production System under Taiichi Ohno identified seven 
forms of waste, known simply as “the seven wastes”, as a tool to identify 
further muda to be eliminated. The seven wastes are: 1. Overproduction, 2. 
Waiting, 3. Transport, 4. Inappropriate processing, 5. Unnecessary inventory, 6. 
Unnecessary/Excess motion, 7. Defects. (McBride 2003, Morgan&Liker 2006: 72). 
Womack and Jones (1996: 15, 314) further identify number eight: products 
designed to not meet the customer’s needs.   
 
Morgan and Liker (2006: 74-75) also stress the fact that the Toyota Production 
System today identifies not only one concept of waste, but three – Muda (non-
value-added), which encompasses the original seven wastes; Muri 
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(overburdening), which is the concept of pushing a machine of person beyond 
their natural limits; and Mura (unevenness), which stands for irregularity in the 
work-load and -schedules.  
 
Taking a step back and reviewing what we have just seen about the Toyota 
Production System, it is clear that what has been done over the decades since 
the Second World Was is, in fact, the development of a whole new way of 
thinking about production. It is a mindset that has been allowed to simmer and 
constantly change in small steps since the beginning. And this culture, distilled 
into the principles of the Toyota Way (presented further below in table one) has 
certainly had the power to bring about impressive production results. The 
bottom line is that all forms of unnecessary and non-value-adding activity are 
frowned upon under the Toyota Production System, and that by constant 
attention to details, this has led to effective production unmatched. The system 
could wring water from even a dry towel, as Shingo (1984: 102) so succinctly 
puts it. 
 
 
The modern Lean production system 
 
Now we move on forward to today’s definition of Lean production. But anyone 
studying the concept of Lean will soon realize that that the line between Lean 
production and the Toyota Production System is not altogether clear-cut; many 
of the practises described earlier are key elements of Lean production too. 
Drawing a line between the two might in fact seem like an attempt to draw a 
line in water. 
 
However, there are certain points that serve to distinguish them. The first is the 
realization that the Toyota Production system is less of a system and more of a 
culture that has been allowed to grow forth over a stretch of several decades. 
The improvements that Toyota have been implementing, have been kaizen 
improvements – continuous. This leads to the fact that the improvement path of 
the Toyota Production System was never clearly documented, and no attempts 
were really made to systematize the development into a theoretical work before 
the world’s interest in the Kanban system was piqued in the early seventies 
(Holweg 2007: 423).  
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Even Taiichi Ohno says in the foreword of Monden’s book:  
 
“since the Toyota production system has been created from actual practises in the 
factories of Toyota it has a strong feature of emphasizing practical effects, and 
actual practice and implementations over theoretical analysis. As a result it was 
our observation that even in Japan it was difficult for the people of outside 
companies to understand our system; still less was it possible for the foreign 
people to understand it (Monden 1983: i)”.  
 
Because of this, Lean production can be said to be the Western world’s (or 
simply the world outside of Toyota) attempt to make systematic use of the 
practises of the Toyota Production System, and continue to develop on the basis 
of these practises.  
 
 
MIT steps into the game 
 
This was the partial aim of the MIT international collaboration research 
program, the International Motor Vehicle Program, which got its start in 1979 as 
a 5-year research program entitled “The Future of the Automobile”, led by 
Daniel Roos (the director of the Center for Transportation Studies) and Alan 
Altshuler (the head of the political science department at MIT). Daniel Jones, 
signed on as UK team leader and later European director of the second phase of 
the programme. The program’s main focus was to research the role of the 
automobile in the future. The program, in addition to other offshoots, resulted 
in a work of conclusion “The Future of the Automobile” in 1984.  
 
The second phase of the programme was led by research director James 
Womack. As a part of the IMVP’s task to increase international discussion on 
the development of the automobile and its industry, conferences were held 
annually to gather researchers and industry people in the same setting. And 
one of the most burning issues of the eighties was the continuous loss of the 
American Big Three’s (GM, Ford and Chrysler) market share to Japanese car 
manufacturers. The discussion naturally centred on one question: what is the 
driving force behind the Japanese competitive advantage? (Holweg 1997: 423-
424.)  
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Various explanations were conceived, many of which relatively hostile: cost 
advantage in wages; “Japan, Inc” (or the orchestration of Japan’s industrial 
policy by MITI, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry); 
cultural differences; technological espionage and trade barriers (Womack 1990: 
236; Holweg 1997: 424). However, eventually, more attention was given to the 
study of the Japanese production solutions. The IMVP set out to describe the 
productivity gap between the Western World and Japan, and to measure its 
extent. A benchmarking methodology was developed by Womack and Jones 
during the mid-eighties, but the empirical side of the research would remain 
spare until another researcher joined the group: John Krafcik.  
 
Krafcik was a quality engineer in the Toyota – General Motors joint venture 
plant NUMMI (or New United Motor Manufacturing Inc), in California before 
he came to MIT for MBA studies (Cusumano&Nobeka 1998: 4, 219). Together 
Womack and Krafcik started visiting and compiling data from initially four 
auto assembly plants. Krafcik presented its key learning at the annual forum:  
 
“NUMMI, within its first year of operation, had achieved a productivity level 
more than 50% higher than that of the technologically similar [GM 
Massachusetts] Framingham plant, and achieved the best quality within GM’s 
entire U.S operation. “ (Holweg 1997: 425-426)   
 
Krafcik continued to gather data for his master’s thesis – a tot al of ninety auto 
assembly plants in a fifteen countries visited – and finalized his output with the 
1988 article "Triumph of the Lean Production System," where the term “Lean 
production” was first used (Womack 1990: 5-6).   
 
The continuation of the assembly plant study over several years, and the 
addition of more plant data reached a sort of culmination in the now world 
famous book “The Machine That Changed the World” by Womack, Jones and 
Roos. It can reasonably be argued that by the time the book was published in 
1990, knowledge of Just-In-Time and the Toyota Production System was 
already internationally available. However, one of the greatest benefits of the 
book was that it opened the eyes of wider public towards the possibility of Lean 
production, and showed those who did know about it before the importance of 
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treating the whole logistic and management system with Lean thinking – not 
just the manufacturing sections. 
 
For more information of the history and development of Lean production 
theory, see figure twelve in appendix one. It features a concise summary of the 
milestones of the development of Lean theory, assembled by Holweg. This 
gives us a good idea on timeline involved, and shows what other authors have 
contributed to the area of the research. 
 
 
Differences between Lean and TPS 
 
The question remains, though. What, if any, are then the actual differences 
between today’s Lean production methodology and today’s Toyota Production 
System, if the former was clearly based on the latter? Very few things, in fact. 
On a general level, one can say that Lean Production has ever been more 
focused on the implementation of specific tools, while the Toyota Production 
system has focused more on teaching through their philosophy, the Toyota 
Way. This is a quite natural outcome, since Toyota thinks of their system as a 
whole, developed through incremental improvement. Lean production, on the 
other hand, is the attempt to introduce an action plan intending to bring other 
companies up to and even beyond the level of Toyota. These differences can be 
seen as a sort of cultural difference: the impatience of the western business 
leaders to get something done, something visible, versus the eastern long term 
commitment attitude. Lean Production is simply said to be an easier concept to 
grasp by the western mind.  
 
Kochnev’s (2007) study of literature on the Toyota Production System and Lean 
production focuses on bringing the differences into contrast. On each of the 14 
Business Principles of the Toyota Way (see table 1 below) as depicted in Jeffery 
Liker’s book “The Toyota way” (2004), he investigates what points are treated 
the most differently in Lean production, in books and literature.  
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Table 1. The business principles of the Toyota Way. (Liker 2004: 24) 
 
1 Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the 
expense of short- term financial goals. 
2 Create continuous process flow to bring problems to surface. 
3 Use "Pull" systems to avoid overproduction. 
4 Level out the work load. 
5 Build a culture of stopping to fix problems, to get quality right the first time. 
6 Standardized tasks are the foundation for continuous improvement and 
employee empowerment. 
7 Use visual controls so no problems are hidden. 
8 Use only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves your people and 
processes. 
9 Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy 
and teach it to others. 
10 Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your company's 
philosophy. 
11 Respect your extended network of partners and suppliers by challenging 
them and helping them improve. 
12 Go and see for yourself to thoroughly understand the situation. 
13 Make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all options; 
implement decisions rapidly. 
14 Become a learning organization through relentless reflection and continuous 
improvement. 
 
 
 
Kochnev’s conclusion is that principles 1, 4, 8, 9, 11 and 13 are not reflected in 
Lean production methodology, or are at least depicted in a significantly 
different way. Again, we see that the differences that stand out most clearly lie 
in planning horizon and individualism; something also inherent n the different 
cultures that spawned the philosophies. Thus principles number one and nine 
are not easily implemented in the western business firm because of difference in 
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time frame, and we can see eastern conservatism and consensus-thinking in 
principles eight and thirteen.  
 
The two remaining principle differences are more general, more moderate. 
Levelling work load is a more stressed sector of improvement in the Toyota 
Production System, implementing the Takt-time concept; Lean Just-in time does 
not necessary put as much focus on this issue. And supply management – as 
Kochnev himself puts it:  
 
“[Lean methodology is] more focused on the mechanics of the supply-chain, while 
The Toyota Way is more concerned with partnering for success with its suppliers 
and helping them improve by sharing and teaching the TPS principles.”  
 
Be his how it may, in the end one is forced to concede that the differences 
between the two systems are quite few and quite indistinct. However, the most 
important thing is perhaps not to focus on the differences, but rather to realize 
that the aim is the same under both systems: the reduction of waste in all its 
forms. It is only natural to conclude then, that they share many of the methods 
that have been seen to get the job done, regardless of origin.  
2.2. Design for Manufacture and Assembly 
As we saw in the previous section, Lean production can be thought of as a 
collected wealth of improvement tools; tools aimed at problem solving and 
improvement. In this work we will focus more specifically on one of these 
aspects of Lean production: Design for Manufacture and Assembly, or DFMA 
for short.  It is such a basic Lean effort, that it is often overshadowed by more 
new-fangled and overwhelming initiatives, but it is nevertheless a concept that 
can tangibly reduce both material waste and process imperfections.  
 
Design for Manufacture and Assembly is a combination term, using Design for 
Manufacture and Design for Assembly together. The two terms are similar, but 
not exactly the same. Design for Manufacture means changing a product design 
to reduce parts count and thus the cost of manufacturing, while at the same 
time keeping the original product function intact. Design for Assembly, on the 
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other hand, means changing a product design to reduce the cost of assembly. 
This involves designing for fewer assembly steps, faster methods, shaping 
components differently, etc. (Shipulski 2008.) Using fewer parts and faster 
processes is Lean thinking in its essence.  
 
Design for Manufacture is a concept that was developed earlier than Design for 
Assembly, if in fact one can say that it was developed at all.  Henry Ford is said 
to have initiated the concept, even though it was not know as such at the time – 
it was simply common sense. According to him, a manufacturer should always 
study what all is absolutely relevant for the product and eliminate the useless 
parts completely. This concept should apply to any object on its way to the shop 
floor, irrespective of its size and value (Rygler 2007).  
  
Design for Assembly on the other hand got its beginning in the late 1950’s and 
early 1960’s, when companies started to realize that the current design methods 
were inadequate for the new style of automated manufacturing. Especially 
robotic manufacturing systems required the manufacturers to start seeing the 
assembly process in a new way. (Causey 1999: 222) One of the earliest works on 
the topic was General Electric’s “The Manufacturing Producibility Handbook”. The 
development continued in different companies all throughout the seventies and 
eighties and eventually many of the rules for correct conduct were quantified 
and programmed into computers programs for automated analysis of designs. 
Through the nineties, more emphasis went into designing not only for 
manufacture, but for all later aspect of the product, such as service, repair, 
disassembly and recyclability (Causey 1999: 223). 
 
The original method was strictly verbal; a general set of rules or guidelines that 
required a human to interpret and design differently for each specific case. The 
second wave represented a more quantitative approach. (Stone, McAdams & 
Kayyalethekkel: 2004: 303.) Boothroyd and Dewhurst’s “Design for Assembly: A 
Designer’s Handbook” from 1983 is perhaps the best known work of that 
methodology, even though the “Assemblability evaluation method” (AEM) by 
Hitachi is said to have come out a little earlier (see Ohashi T. et al. (1983). The 
automatic assembly line for VTR mechanisms) The Boothroyd Dewhurst, Inc. 
company is the owner of the ‘‘DFMA’’ trademark, presently.  
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The Boothroyd and Dewhurst method originally assigned each part of the 
design with a numeric value depending on its manufacturability. The numbers 
are summed for the entire design and the resulting value is used as a guide to 
the overall quality of the design. After this, the product is redesigned, using the 
numerical values as an indicator of where to redesign the most. (Stone et al. 
2004: 303.) This is still a method that requires much insight into design and 
knowledge of alternatives by the designer, however. 
 
These approaches eventually evolved into today’s modern methodology, in 
which the entire process is fully automated. By building an expert system using 
the general design rules, the program can be made to analyse a design and 
optimise it by repeatedly iterating the design according to the rules. (Stone et al. 
2004: 303.) This approach is still a field of active research, however, as the 
process is difficult and inherently qualitative – not the type a machine can easily 
be made to understand.  
 
 
General guidelines 
 
Causey (1999: 226-229) presents some of the basic rules on how Design for 
Manufacture and Assembly should be implemented, for the use with a 
automated robot assembly line, similar to that of an automotive industry 
producer (also see Rampersad (1996: 14) and Edwards (2002: 654-656) for 
further sets of instructions). They are presented here as an example of the 
principles that guide the redesign process, to illustrate which type of changes 
the DFMA may produce. 
 
1. Use snap fits rather than threaded fits. Screwing and nut or a screw is a time-
consuming process, even to a robot. And if the robot cannot perform an 
unlimited amount of rotations, it will have to release and regrip the screw 
several times, adding time to the operation.  Also, the possibility of threading 
the screw wrong is likely, resulting in a scrapped piece. This adds time to the 
operation and increases the waste potential of the process. 
 
2. Minimize assembly forces.  If large force is required to assemble parts then 
dedicated assembly machinery may be necessary. Since most robots are only 
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capable of relatively small force (using electric motivators) this means that the 
robot will have to hand off the part and move out of the way while the 
dedicated machine is used. More time is required for the operation and more 
opportunities for part error arise. 
 
3. Design generous tolerances. When less precision is necessary when assembling, 
reliability is increased. Assembly robots are often less precise than dedicated 
machinery. A guidance structure (chamfer) will make the structure more 
tolerant to the robot’s imperfect aim. 
 
4.  Design smooth gripping surfaces. This will allow the gripper to correct any 
misalignment of the part when it retrieves it. Parts with serrated edges will 
easily hang on to the edges of the gripper jaws rather than finding its right 
alignment.  
 
5. Design for vertical assembly. It is easier and quicker to assemble components by 
stacking them on than by any other motion. Moving through many different 
motions and directions is generally slower than a single dimension move only. 
By designing with this in mind, a tangible increase in the assembly speed can be 
realized. See also Rampersad (1996: 9-11) 
 
6. Minimize assembly component count. The original principle of Design for 
Manufacture. Designs with a minimum number of components reduce the 
number of tools and feeders required. A simpler product is a more reliable 
product plus cheaper, faster to produce and faster to assemble.  
 
7.  Design parts and grippers together. This way the gripper can be made to handle 
more than one type of part, so that a minimum number of grippers are needed 
for any given assembly. In addition, gripper and component material can be 
matched to improve the security of grip and reliability of the system.  
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DFMA and the Asian car manufacturers 
 
Leaving the theory aside for a moment, we can ask ourselves why this specific 
tool – DFMA – is so relevant to this study of Lean production. The answer is: 
because the Asian car companies are said to be good at it. In “The Machine That 
Changed the World” Womack et al. (1990: 96-97) present the results of an IMVP 
survey where car manufacturers were asked to rank each other in terms of 
manufacturability. They should know, it is argued, since car manufacturers 
regularly purchase and disassemble competitor’s cars, looking for innovations 
and other interesting features. From the survey result, presented in figure two, 
we can see two things: as the lower figure shows, Design for Manufacture is a 
tangible part of the effective running of a automotive production plant, and in 
addition we can see that Toyota, Honda and Mazda (all Japanese automakers) 
rank the top three in perceived manufacturability. Interesting results, but this is 
of course something that we will investigate more closely further on in the 
work.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Results of the IMPV Manufacturability survey 1990 (Womack et al. 
1990: 96-97). 
. 
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2.3. Asian car manufacturers and Lean production 
Now, considering the fact that we have so far mostly talked about Toyota, it is 
advisable to take a step back and look at the bigger picture. What are the 
regional implications of what we have studied? What success did the other 
Asian car producers achieve, and what happened to the European brands? In 
this section we will study the production regions as a whole, and see what 
trends have been at work the last few decades.  
 
The other Asian car manufacturers 
 
In general, the literature on Lean production makes two simplifications when 
talking about region and produce. When speaking about Toyota, the term 
“Japanese auto manufacturers” in plural is used quite casually. Furthermore, 
“Asia” is mostly used synonymously with Japan.  
 
There is of course a certain basis for this custom. As Michael Cusamo writes in 
his text “Japanese Technology Management: Innovations, Transferability, and the 
Limitations of "Lean" Production” (1992), the nine major Japanese automakers 
absorbed the Lean production principles soon – a loose period of time from the 
1960’s to the first half of the 1970’s. Thus they were able to use their skills in 
manufacture and product development to aggressively expand from the late 
1970’s forward. Toyota led the way, accompanied by Honda, said to have had a 
comparative advantage in its product development processes (Womack 1990: 
109-112). Honda continues to be a strong product developer even today, and a 
entire chapter could well have been dedicated here to Honda’s best product 
development practises..   
 
It should not be assumed that the Japanese automakers all took exactly the 
same path forward, however; by natural reasons the companies adapted the 
best practises to fit their own company. For instance, Honda, having a more 
dispersed factory network than Toyota, experienced traffic and rush-hour 
problems that disrupted their Just-In-Time system, forcing them to keep 
somewhat larger stocks of inventory than their Toyota counterpart. (Cusamo 
1992.) Furthermore, it should not be said that all Japanese companies are 
equally skilled in Lean production. Some have more Lean production mentality 
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than others, while others have kept more of the traditional mass production 
philosophy intact.   
 
As for the other Asian countries, there are not many stories of success outside of 
Japan. Womack et al (1990: 261-263) use South Korea’s Hyundai as an example 
of the situation in the newly developing Southeast Asian countries, at the time. 
Making only cheap, low quality trucks sold mainly to other developing 
countries on price alone, the Korean government saw their chance for change in 
the economic crisis of 1979. Japanese exports had grown somewhat dearer, and 
the Korean government seized on the chance to capitalize on their own lower 
wage rates. They started an extensive mass production program of a basically 
Japanese design car model (the Hyundai Excel), and succeeded very well in 
their endeavour – at first. Initially, the Hyundai Excel made substantial export 
sales. But only two years later the Korean currency started to appreciate, 
worker’s wage demands started rising. This quickly ate up the only production 
advantage the Korean’s had, and when prices started to converge, the poor 
quality of the Korean output started to show. Furthermore, Japan’s initial 
aggressive exports strategy had already made the rest of the world touchy 
about cheap foreign imports, making Korea’s continued success even harder.  
 
So all in all, one can be excused for thinking that Japan’s other automakers are 
similar to Toyota (at least in varying degree) and that the other Asian countries 
were not as successful in their production practises. Furthermore, as we can see 
in figure three, Japan was (and is) certainly in a class of its own when 
considering world share of motor vehicle production. The other Asian countries 
(mainly China and Korea) are included in two other categories: Newly 
Industrializing Countries and Rest Of World. These shares of world production 
are, however, marginal at best, and not showing very substantial growth with 
time. Japan, on the other hand, increased its market share from zero to 
approximately 25 percent of the world production over a scope of 30 years. It is 
interesting to notice, also, that their gain was clearly North America’s loss (at 
least when considering production figures). And finally, the Europeans? As we 
can see, their production figures have remained remarkably unchanged 
throughout the entire period – a curious stability in the face of the Japanese 
expansion. Are European car producers also masters of Lean production? 
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Figure 3. Shares of World Motor Vehicle Production by Region, 1955-1989 
(Womack et al 1990: 44). 
 
 
 
 
  
28 
The European car manufacturers 
 
The literature suggests that the answer is no. Historically, the European car 
producers were characterized by their heritage of craft production, beginning 
with the first automobiles of Daimler, Benz and their peers. This practise 
continued even up until the Second World War. The Ford Motor Company 
made serious attempts at establishing mass production plants in Britain and 
Europe before this, of course, and European manufacturers struggled to 
implement the new ideas on their own. But the change did not truly catch on 
before after the wars, when many old customs were forced to die out of 
necessity. Volkswagen caught on to the mass production trend strongly (the 
Volkswagen Beetle being an excellent example), and Renault, Fiat and others 
followed the same suit. (Womack et al 1990: 228-236.) 
 
However, according to Womack et al (1990: 239-240), the Europeans reacted 
much in the same way to Lean production as to the new ideas of mass 
production: sluggishly. If North America came second to the Japanese in 
discovering Lean Production, apparently Europe came third. So if not through 
Lean Production, how did the European producers keep their sales intact in the 
face of the new competition, as is evident from figure three?  
 
The answer, Womack et al (1990: 239, 254) feel, is trade barriers. The “fortress 
Europe” concept, that limited European openness to foreign exports, granted 
the European automakers a substantial, safe market for their own cars, 
produced with high efficiency or low. Market limits and import tariffs were 
used widely. The North American way – very free market access for any 
company willing to build an assembly plant on American soil – was thought of 
as naïve in Europe. It was considered that the result would be numerous simple 
European assembly plants where no value was added, intellectually run from 
Japan.  
 
Whatever the truth of these thoughts may be, it is doubtful whether the 
European could have managed to keep their market share as constant under 
entirely free competition. In figure four we can see statistics over labour 
productivity and defect rates in the auto components’ industry, in selected 
European countries and Japan  (Oliver, Delbridge & Lowe 1996: 89). As we can 
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see, the Japanese figures are in the lead – presumably by Lean production. 
However, we can also see that there are substantial internal differences between 
the European producers. Europe’s internal markets are certainly more 
fractioned than North America’s or Japan’s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Productivity and defect rates in the auto components’ industry, 
Europe and Japan (Oliver et al. 1996: 89). 
 
 
So while the European producers as a whole are not well versed in Lean 
Production, there are exceptions. The chapter “Lean Thinking versus German 
Technik” of Womack & Jones (1996, 189-218) is the account of how the Porsche 
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company implemented Lean production techniques in the time between 1991 
and 1994. They did this under the guidance of Japanese experts, having seen a 
crisis brewing in their current situation. This was a truly significant changeover 
since Porsche has ever been seen as “The” representative of craft design. Each 
car was hand finished to rectify any mistakes, ensuring that the final product 
was perfect. However, this custom, combined with the high prices charged for 
one automobile, just covered the fact that many mistakes were made in the 
production process and that rework was necessary – at all. So this, in 
combination with unfavourable currency changes (the mark strengthening 
against the dollar, Porsche’s biggest market), led to Porsche’s situation 
becoming unstable. The change to Lean production, in effect, seemed the only 
way to go.  
 
However, it should be stressed that the European markets have even more 
variation than this: some companies chose to explore totally new and different 
production solutions to better suit their own needs – much like the Japanese 
themselves in the beginning. One of the most advanced experiments in new 
production methods was the Volvo model, tested out in its plants in Uddevalla 
(opened 1989) and Kalmar (opened 1972). This was not a Lean Production 
method after the Japanese model, but instead an individually developed 
system, more appropriate to the labour conditions of Sweden.  
 
According to Muffatto (1999: 20-22) the main point of the Kalmar facility were 
the abandonment of the traditional moving line in favour of a series of 
independent lines, in sequence and separated by buffers. The product was still 
in motion on each line, but current model could be changed much more quickly 
than with a conventional line – a significant increase in flexibility. The second 
and even more non-conforming plant at Uddevalla, on the other hand, 
implemented the “dock” system: assembly was carried out using a stationary 
production cell system. Each work cell was responsible for completing a 
significant portion of the car; each group working on four vehicles in various 
stages of assembly with a complete cycle time of two hours. 
 
The system was built with focus on the worker. Since each worker got to see the 
product finished by his or her own hand, much of the mechanic drudgery of the 
moving assembly line was eliminated. The system was, in addition, very 
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flexible: the capacity was there to assemble a large number of variations and 
models, and the changeover of models was easy. However, it was criticized by 
Lean production proponents for being less productive in terms of output than 
the Lean Japanese method (Womack 1990: 102). Muffatto (1999: 21) rebuffs this 
critique: according to him the results at the Uddevalla plant were good – 
comparable to that of the Japanese producers even, if all the benefits from 
increased flexibility are fully observed.   
 
According to him, (Muffatto 1999: 21) the most interesting feature of the system 
was its effect on lead times. In fact, return to normal productivity levels after 
model change-over, was 50 percent less than the industry norm. This factor 
later made the Volvo experiment of considerable interest to the proponents of 
Time Based Competition and Quick Response Management, which focus on the 
competitive advantage of reducing lead times over reduction of cost through 
waste-elimination (see for instance Rajan, Suri (1998).  Quick Response 
Manufacturing: A Companywide Approach to Reducing Lead Times) 
 
However, the Volvo experiment came to an end.  The two model plants for the 
Volvo system, Uddevalla and Kalmar, were closed in 1993 and 1994 
respectively. Volvo introduced another production concept based on the pre-
assembly of modules to be finally assembled by highly automated lines. This 
choice indicated that Volvo has decided to abandon its own model, and that the 
Japanese model had “won”. However, Muffatto (1996: 22) chooses to see this as 
a result of the path Volvo took with respect to internationalisation of its 
production and its partnership policies rather than of weakness of results.  
 
In conclusion, despite the local efforts of certain European car producers, 
Europe lagged behind Asia and North America in industry productivity (in the 
beginning of the nineties). Japan was leading, by means of the Lean production 
methodology and the original Toyota Production System, while North America 
was struggling in the process of implementing Lean.  By Japanese instruction or 
by own initiative, they were beginning to get to grips with the method, 
however. This is the setting in which this work will make its analysis; this is the 
hypothetical basis for what we expect to see from the data analysis. What the 
analysis itself will say, however, remains to be seen.  
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3.  BROWSING FOR THE RIGHT CARS AND PARTS 
In the previous chapter we saw the theoretical background for the questions we 
hope to answer on the basis of the data analysis. We saw that Design for 
Manufacture and Assembly is an important aspect of Lean Production; we saw 
that the Asian automakers are experts in Lean thinking, and that according to 
the survey carried out by Womack et al (as seen in figure two), the Asian are 
well versed in DFMA. Now let’s see whether we can find additional evidence of 
this. This section presents the methods used for selection of the data: sample 
cars and relevant sub-assemblies.  
3.1. Methods 
Out of what we saw in the previous section, we have the first research question: 
on the basis of data on twelve cars (four Asian, four North American and four 
European) from insurance collision estimation manuals from the years 1990 and 
1991 – will we be able to see that the Asian cars contain fewer parts and can be 
repaired in less time? Secondly, will the results of the cars of one production 
region be close enough to each other that something can be said reliably about a 
region’s success in DFMA and Lean design? And finally, the third research 
question: what cars will have the least parts and shortest service times, or most 
parts and longest service times? 
 
A few points of definition in the questions. Why twelve cars? This is due to 
reasons of comparability and availability of data, as will be seen later on in the 
car selection chapter. As for the data source, the Collision Estimating Guides - 
Mitchell International, San Diego, California is an established firm in the 
insurance, collision repair, medical claims, and auto glass replacement 
industries (Mitchell International 2009). Its guides are used by insurance 
companies and collision repair facilities to estimate monetary values for the 
time and parts spent to repair a damaged sub-section of a car. Their annual 
guides account for the greater part of a year’s models. 
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As such, they can be seen as a relatively unbiased source of information on 
parts count and repair times of certain car models. Admittedly, to service a car 
is not the same thing as assembly in an assembly plant. However, one could 
reasonably imagine that a subsection of a car that uses fewer parts and takes a 
short time to attach should also be easy to remove and disassemble.  
 
The estimation guides used for data are from 1990 and 1991 – this because 
differences in Lean production measure and between production region should 
still be quite visible, at that point in time. The car companies have been growing 
more similar in their production methods as of late, a trend that is also 
discussed in Womack et al (1990), Womack & Jones (1996), Cusumano & 
Nobeka (1998) and Muffatto (1999). This would suggest the differences between 
the results of selected cars growing less visible, as we come closer to today’s 
date. Conversely, the differences may have been greater before the chosen point 
in time, in the seventies and eighties. However, this is perhaps the most suitable 
time period by another reason: it connects nicely to the book “The Machine That 
Changed the World”, which was released around that time.  
 
 
Data selection and Analysis 
 
Then how are we to find the answer to these questions? First of all, we must 
select the cars to be used as a proxy of the Asian, North American and 
European production. The maximum amount of cars for the time period should 
be used – but the cars should also be entirely comparable in build. Therefore we 
must limit ourselves to one type, size and class of car, and select the greatest 
amount of cars possible for that comparison. For these cars, we must select a 
(preferably large) amount of sub-sections, or assembly sections that can act as a 
proxy for the time it would take to dissemble and assemble the entire car. These 
should be general enough to be present on every car that we select (no optional 
sections, such as sunroof, air conditioning, etc.). On the basis of this selection of 
data, we will then perform a simple analysis to determine the answers to the 
research questions.  
 
To answer the first research question – whether Asian cars are designed more 
Lean (or DFMA) – we will check how often a car is faster to service than 
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average or contains fewer parts than average, when comparing the data for 
each sub-assembly of the cars. The more times a car is below average, in service 
time and in parts count, the more Lean its design. In addition we swill sum up 
all the Asian cars’ ‘below average’ –instances in one lump, all the North 
American in another, all the European in a third. Finally we will perform a chi 
squared test to see whether there are statistically significant differences between 
production regions – whether the production region affects the frequency of 
‘Leaner than average’ (more DFMA) outcomes.  
 
To answer the third research question – which cars are most Lean in design – 
we will make scatterplots for both time usage and parts usage. On one axis will 
be the frequency of ‘Leaner than average’ outcomes for each car and on the 
second axis, the sum total of the time used for repairs, or the parts total. From 
this scatterplot we should be able to pinpoint the most and least Lean cars, but 
also be able to observe whether there is any regional cohesion between the car 
models, thus answering the second research question.  
3.2. Selecting the cars  
There is reason to choose the cars with care, taking several different points into 
consideration for maximum comparability. If the cars are not clearly similar in 
design (say the difference between a sedan model and a truck model) all 
differences in assembly time and parts count could easily be dismissed as 
model specific. However, if we select cars which are of the same body type, of 
same motor and drive type (generally) and being roughly the same in size, we 
can already start assuming that any differences found are, to a good degree, 
significant. Also – a practical point – the cars should be present in the collision 
estimating guides. 
 
At first, a shortcut to a good selection seemed to be the smartest route. If a good 
classification system of cars categorized by size, price and type could be found, 
the initial selection would certainly be helped along greatly. Such a registry 
does in fact exist – the international ACRISS or SIPP code classification. ACRISS 
stands for the Association of Car Rental Industry Systems Standards, and is a 
  
35 
set of car classifications jointly agreed upon by the major car rental companies 
of the world (Avis, Hertz, Budget, Europcar and several others). The code for a 
car is four letters long, the first giving the class of the car (Compact, Economy, 
Intermediate, Premium, Elite, etc.) and the other three giving details about the 
specific car’s type (door number and body type), drive system/transmission and 
motor type, respectively (ACRISS Selling Guide 2008). The car class (the first 
letter) is furthermore derived from an algorithm dependent on price class and 
engine size (ACRISS secretariat 2008), making this classification well near ideal 
for making comparisons. Just one small problem, though. They only do modern 
cars.  
 
After communicating with the ACRISS secretariat, the problem stood clear. 
While they would helpfully share the classifications of a set of cars, most of the 
cars that seemed of interest in the guides are now discontinued, or have at least 
evolved substantially from their origin. Because of this, the ACRISS 
classification was not to be of use in this specific selection. As for a personal 
guess, however, the cars that were eventually chosen would probably fall under 
the intermediate or standard classes of the ACRISS classification, had the 
system been grading models as far back as 1990.  
 
The next try was more based on hard work and, as such, naturally gave better 
results. The source for comparison this time was Road & Track Magazine’s 
“Complete Car Buyer's Guide –91”, which exhibits less narrowly defined 
classes (only five – Sports & GT, 2-seaters, Family, Economy and Luxury). This 
guide, however, together with additional data from the Finnish car sales’ portal 
Autotalli.fi (approximately Garage.fi), nevertheless provided enough 
information to make an educated selection. 
 
The car type, then. The easiest class of cars to compare is probably the sedan 
type family car, used and marketed over the whole globe as it is – a fact 
supported by the availability of data in the collision estimating guides. 
Furthermore, the general family sedan seems to be a front motor, front wheel 
drive, four door car, available with a five gear manual transmission (even 
though automatic transmission is certainly more common in the United States).  
There are differences in equipment levels and superficial design between 
brands, but the basic structures used are often similar.  In addition to these 
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features, the price level of the car and the motor size should preferably be 
similar between models. This to guarantee that that the level of extra equipment 
and trimmings remain at the lowest possible level, and that the car remains a 
certain size.  
 
Based on these parameters, it is eventually possible to make a selection of 
twelve similar, suitable cars manufactured in 1990-91. These, together with their 
specifications for price, measurement, drive type, engine and country of origin 
are presented in table two.  The first four of the models, from Honda, Hyundai, 
Nissan and Toyota are of course Asian. The second four are European and the 
last three are North American.  
 
The number twelve is mainly a result of necessity: while there are more than 
twelve such car models manufactured at this specific point in time, only four 
such comparable models are manufactured in Europe AND presented in the 
collision estimating guides. For a fair comparison to be possible, there cannot be 
less of one region’s models than of the other’s. A harsh constraint, certainly, but 
the world seldom offers ideal data. There are several significant American and 
Asian models that were left outside of the analysis just because of this fact, 
however.  
 
The cars themselves are all well-known models, much sold, and much used. For 
instance, the Ford Taurus is still in production, and since its launch in 1986, it 
has sold over 6,7 million units worldwide as of 2007 – the fifth best selling 
North American model in Ford's history (Cars-directory 2009a). The Toyota 
Camry, similarly, was the best selling car in the United States for nine out of ten 
years between 1997 and 2007 (Cars-directory 2009b). Honda Accord was the 
best-selling Japanese car there for 20 years (1982-97) and has sold around ten 
million units in the U.S. market alone (Cars-directory 2009c).  
 
The list continues. The Volkswagen Passat has been one of Volkswagen's best-
selling and most-profitable models in nearly every market, the Peugeot 405 was 
voted European Car of the Year for 1988 by the largest number of votes in the 
history of the contest and the Nissan Bluebird is one of the longest-running 
nameplates from a Japanese automaker (started 1957) (Cars-directory 2009d,e,f). 
Even the Saab 900 was a big brand for the small producer, with around a 
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million units sold in all (Cars-directory 2009g). Together, these cars made out a 
sizable portion of the world’s car fleet at one point in time. 
 
As for the Asian contingent, the Hyundai Sonata can be considered something 
of an Asian wildcard, for the sake of not examining only Japanese car 
companies. The same thing could be said for the Saab model, since it is a 
comparatively small batch model compared to the others. It should nevertheless 
be interesting to see how the small Scandinavian manufacturer’s model fares 
against the larger companies. As for the Audi and Volkswagen models, one 
could reasonably expect a turnout quite similar to each other, the former 
company being a wholly owned daughter company of the latter. Finally the 
American models – chosen along the lines that each member of the “Big Three” 
should have at least one candidate present (GM gets two).  
  
The cars chosen are reasonably similar in design, price and build. The lengths 
and widths of the cars are within ten centimetres of each other, the door/seat 
combinations are the same, save for one or two cases. The motor size range is as 
small as possible, only a bout a half litre in cylinder displacement. Same type of 
gearbox, same drive layout is also used.  
 
There are differences, of course – we can clearly see that the American cars are 
in the upper range concerning the motor size (Cylinder displacement, cc), 
which is natural, since it is difficult to find models with even this small engine 
size in the United States (at this point in time, naturally). Conversely, it is 
difficult to find family models from Europe and Asia with over 2500 cc cylinder 
displacement. The same relationship is visible also in car size, the American 
cars generally being larger and often using a six seats, automatic transmission 
layout. The goal of the selection just had to be the smallest possible range of 
difference. 
 
 
 
  
38 
 
Table 2. The selected cars. 
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We can notice, also, that there are variations in the suspension and brake 
systems too. These are more or less region specific, and more or less impossible 
to work out of the comparison. The differences are not awfully large, however, 
as the subsequent parts and service time data revealed: never more than one or 
two parts, and never revealing a clear relation to faster service times. Thus we 
can only conclude, again, that the world seldom offers ideal data, and that no 
two cars are ever sufficiently alike to be totally comparable. Nevertheless, our 
study is one of Lean design – and as such, we can assume on several accounts 
that surely the more Lean-aware company would have chosen the system most 
beneficial to these principles. If so, the comparison should still be relevant to us.  
3.3. Selecting the assemblies 
For these twelve cars we must choose a goodly number of sub-assemblies, and 
collect their time and parts data. This is, much like the cars, a choice dictated by 
availability, since it is imperative that all the chosen cars share the same stat. At 
the same time, the assemblies chosen must be general enough to be present on 
all models.  
 
In appendix one: figures 13-15, we see a few pages copied from the collision 
estimating guides, showing a few assemblies for the Toyota Camry model. The 
full listing for one model is 10-15 pages, but a sample should be enough to show 
the idea of the data gathering. As we can see, most of the assemblies have a 
collection stat in the beginning of the assembly listing, describing how long it 
would take to either R&I (Repair and Install), O/H (Overhaul) or Refinish said 
assembly.  
 
The definitions of these terms are stated in the collision estimating guides:  
 
“Remove and Install (R&I): Remove a part or assembly, set it aside and 
reinstall it later. The time shown includes the alignment that can be done by 
shifting the part or assembly.” (Collision Estimating Guide Imported 1991: 
P3). 
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The term Remove and Replace (R&R) can be used almost synonymously, since 
in that case, the part is removed and replaced with a new replacement part. In 
both cases, there is no damage to the part being removed and installed.  
 
“Overhaul (O/H): Remove an assembly, disassemble, clean and visually inspect 
it, replace needed parts, reassemble and reinstall on the vehicle making any 
necessary adjustments.”  
 
This is a more time consuming process than Remove & Install, and both stats 
are often given together, just for the estimator to choose method.  
 
And finally Refinish – the process where a certain panel is removed, prepared, 
repainted and re-installed on the vehicle. This is a procedure where the 
principles of DFMA are not as clearly visible – most of the time goes not to 
removal and installation, but rather to the paint job – and as such should be 
considered an inferior indicator to the other two. However, for comparable 
vehicles, there is a certain degree of comparability even here.  
 
In general, the ranking of the three indicators is such that Overhaul beats 
Remove and Install, which in turn beats Refinish. This because the more time is 
actually used to disassemble parts and assemble them, the more does the basic 
design come into play – an assembly designed to the principles of DFMA 
should be make this process faster, and visibly so.  
 
A few points on the data presented in the estimating guides. The labour times 
shown in the guides are given in hours and tenths of hours, thus 0,1 hours 
represent six minutes. As is also explained in the guides  
 
“[the times] are for replacement with new undamaged parts from the vehicle 
manufacturer on a new undamaged vehicle… The actual time taken by individual 
repair facilities to replace collision damaged parts can be expected to vary due to 
severity of collision, vehicle condition, equipment used, etc.” (Collision 
Estimating Guide Imported 1991: P3). 
 
 Because of this fact, the assembly aspect of the service operations can be 
considered to be quite close to actual assembly, even though some work 
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moments may be performed by robot or specialized machinery in the assembly 
plant. 
 
The parts stats are collected in the simplest possible way – counting the 
numbered parts and assemblies of the sub-section. This even though some parts 
are not included in the numbering, or already included in a larger, numbered 
assembly. Why? Because to do this another way would include value 
judgements on every point, something that only a good mechanic could with 
any reliability. As it is, the parts count may be sketchy, but most importantly, 
exactly as sketchy for every car and every assembly. In other words equal.  
 
The service time and parts of the selected assemblies are shown in tables three 
and four respectively. The assemblies are chosen by default: any assembly that 
has a suitable comparative service time stat and a suitable comparative parts 
chart is recorded. Table five shows the list of assemblies that were not chosen, 
and the motivation. In most cases an assembly yields both time and a part data, 
but in a few cases (also listed in table five) there is a good comparable stat for 
one but not the other – in these cases only the one has been recorded. As we can 
see from the time data, there are some instances where more than one service 
stat is recorded (i.e. an assembly has a stat for both Remove & Install AND 
Overhaul, or for Refinish AND Remove & Install). In the coming analysis, only 
the “best” data on the basis of the earlier definition will be used, but here our 
only objective is to gather as much data as possible.  
 
The data is labelled as exactly as necessary – if there are different service times 
or parts counts for assemblies on different sides of the vehicle, for instance, it is 
important to state which of these we will be comparing.  
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Table 3. Service time data for the selected cars. 
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Table 4.  Parts data for the selected cars. 
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Data for Parts, none for Time 
 
  
 
Assembly Motivation 
 
Air cleaner No assy stat 
 
Cooling system No complete assy stat, only hoses R&I 
 
Instrument panel No comparable assy stats 
 
Center console No comparable assy stats 
 
  
 
  
 
Data for Time, none for Parts 
 
  
 
Assembly Motivation 
 
Seat (front, driver's) No comparable assy part chart  
 
Engine/trans assy No comparable assy part chart  
 
  
 
  
 
Rejected assemblies 
 
  
 
Assembly Motivation 
 
Wheel Car dependent 
 
Steering column Steering wheel sometimes included 
 
Electical system  Model dependent 
 
Emission system Model dependent 
 
Air conditioning Model dependent 
 
Sunroof Model dependent 
 
Luggage lid / Liftgate Model dependent 
 
Headlamp front assy Model dependent 
 
Lamp assy back Model dependent 
 
Grille Model dependent 
 
Ground effects Model dependent 
 
Windshield Similar for all 
 
Quarter glass Similar for all 
 
Back window Similar for all 
 
Steering pump Very engine dependent 
 
Rear body No comparable assy 
 
Fuel tank No comparable assy 
 
Roof No comparable assy 
 
Rocker/pillars/floor No comparable assy 
 
Cowl & Dash No comparable assy 
 
Front inner structure No comparable assy 
 
Radiator support assy No comparable assy 
 
Table 5. Rejected assemblies. 
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4. DIGGING IN THE DATA 
In this section we will focus on answering the research questions on the basis of 
the research data: will Asian cars be Leaner in design, considering their 
expertise in the field of Lean production, will the cars’ results be so close for 
different companies in the same region that something can be said about the 
region’s expertise and what cars will in fact come out on top and bottom in the 
test? To do this, we must normalize the data for comparison, and evaluate it, 
visually and by statistical method.  
4.1. Normalization of data 
Once the data is collected, it must be made fit for analysis. A normalization of 
the data is necessary, so that one is able to compare not only between the cars, 
but also between individual assemblies. But even before this is done, some of 
the service time data must be cut out. Namely, as mentioned in the data 
selection section, there is more service time data collected than is good to use in 
the analysis; see for instance the data for the front fender assemblies. In this case 
there are measurements not only for one type of repair, but three. And since the 
different repair indicators are closely linked (if one takes a long time, the other 
take a long time), using them all in the analysis would result in a systematic 
bias. Therefore, we will weed out the “unnecessary” data. The principle we 
follow here is the one stated earlier on - that Overhaul beats Remove and 
Install, which in turn beats Refinish. The resulting time data is given in table six. 
The parts data, on the other hand is good as it is. For one assembly there can be 
several service time indicators, but only one parts count. Thus we leave the 
parts data as is.  
 
Having done this, it is interesting to see what the data dells us already now. For 
easier visualisation, the time and parts data can be presented as graphs, 
showing the repair time and parts data for each assembly, for each car model. 
One line represents a car; all the assemblies it contains. The aim is of course for 
a car model to show as low a line as possible on the y-axis – a Lean design car 
takes little time to service, and uses few parts.  
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Figure 5. Service time per assembly (hours). 
 
  
46
 
  
47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Parts count per assembly.
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Figures five and six show service times and parts count, respectively. That there 
are differences between assemblies here is no surprise, of course. An engine is 
bound to take longer to service than a seat. However, we can see here that there 
are assemblies where there is very little spread between car models, and other 
where there is much. One would assume that assembly complexity would be a 
major factor here, but it is hard to say directly form the graphs (front drive axle 
spread is almost smaller than rear bumper spread, for instance). However, more 
interestingly, we can see that the parts graph is much more chaotic than the 
service chart. While the latter seems to follow a relatively tight band (except for 
outshoots such as the Saab reading on the front fender) the parts graph 
fluctuates wildly, only barely following a certain trend.  
 
 
Normalization 
 
Now let us go back to the data in its pure form. To normalize this data, one of 
the simplest methods is of course to use the comparison to average: if one 
calculates the arithmetic average of all readings for one assembly type, and then 
compares each individual value to this average, we will easily see which 
models contribute negatively or positively to the average. In other words, 
which models are faster than average to service, and which models use fewer 
parts than average.  
 
This procedure is shown in tables six and seven. Both tables are built in the 
same way: the higher table show the actual count – actual service time in hours, 
or actual parts count. The lower table is a derivative of the higher – it shows 
how much each measurement above differs from the average of that assembly 
type. The average is at the base of each column in the higher table. One 
assembly type is shown as one column, each model’s data for that particular 
assembly shown there. One car model represents one row in each the table. So, 
for instance, we can see that the average time to overhaul the front suspension 
of the cars is 3,8 hours. However, on the Honda Accord you can do this 
somewhat faster: it only takes 3,6 hours. And as we can see in the lower table, 
this is 4 percent faster than the average.  
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We are interested in Lean design here. Because of this, the negative values are 
more interesting – a car model with many negative values in the lower table is 
one that is often faster than average to repair, and often uses fewer parts than 
average in its assemblies. Negative is a good thing.  Because of this, the positive 
values in the table are marked, to increase the visual transparency of the table – 
the fewer marked cells a model has in its line, the more “Lean” it is.  
 
In addition, we are naturally not interested only in the direction of the values; 
we are also interested in their magnitude. Any large number is something that 
affects the average, and in turn may say something about the technology used 
in that particular assembly. A large negative number hints of thoroughly Lean 
design.  
 
Now, to see what the tables tell us. By glancing quickly at the marked 
percentages of the lower tables, we see that the Asian car models are looking 
good in the service times. Their marked cells are in minority, quite clearly. 
Similarly, they are in majority to the European brands. Nothing said so far 
about the magnitude of the cells, just the frequency. However, this glance seems 
to point toward what the theory told us.  
 
On the other hand, the parts table is less easily read: the table gives us a 
relatively even distribution over the field, marked and unmarked cells in equal 
numbers. Interestingly enough, the North American cars seem to be stronger in 
this comparison –stronger than the Asians – even though it is of course too 
early to say for sure.  
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Table 6. Service time (percent of average). 
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Table 7. Parts count (percent of average). 
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At this point it is also possible to graph the two percentage tables, to give us an 
idea of what the time and parts fluctuations look like when normalized. These 
graphs are presented in figures seven and eight. Seeing these charts next to each 
other, makes us realize why normalization is necessary. The fluctuations are 
seldom outside the 50 percent range, negative or positive. This despite the 
seemingly chaotic graph of parts count in figure six. In fact, that chaos may 
purely be an artefact of differences in scale of the two previous graphs – 
something which is now corrected through the process of normalization.  
 
Other than this, however, there is very little the graphs can tell us as to regional 
trends or Lean design ranking. They are simply too crowded to interpret. 
Nevertheless, we can point out the abnormalities here, such as the Saab’s front 
fender in the service time charts (apparently consists of two major plates 
instead of being an integrated whole as most other model’s) and Honda 
Accord’s high parts usage in suspensions and steering linkage. Why are they 
built this way? A good question, and hard to answer. It is easy to jump to the 
conclusion that these models used poor DFM- and DFA-techniques, but the real 
reason could also be something else: accommodating some other assembly, 
using tried and tested parts instead of designing something new, using a 
cheaper solution, etc. Also, by just focusing on the one assembly, one can forget 
that the other assemblies, which may well get very competitive results. Because 
of this it is imperative not to jump to conclusions, so far. 
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Figure 7. Service time per assembly (percent of average).
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Figure 8. Parts count per assembly (percent of average).  
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4.2. Statistically significant differences between regions? 
First of all, let us attempt to find an answer to the first research question: will 
Asian cars be Leaner in design, considering their expertise in the field of Lean 
production? To do this with some degree of objectivity, the best way is to use a 
statistical tool to check for significance: in this case the Chi squared test will do 
nicely. It is a relatively simple test to perform, and will say whether there is 
some statistically significant connection between production region and the 
Lean design level of the car models.  
 
A few words of caution here, however. The Chi squared test is of course only as 
good at the data it is used on. In this case the data mass, despite being adequate 
for a test to be done, is nevertheless small. It is only based upon the input of 
twelve cars, multiplied by the number of chosen assemblies. This is still a very 
small data basis, prone to exaggerated irregularities. And in addition, it should 
not be taken to mean that any results will speak for all Asian cars or all North 
American or all European. It will simply say something about these Asian etc. 
cars. On the other hand, it is possible to see these cars as a proxy for the greater 
production – the cars are in most cases popular specimen that have at some 
point made up a sizeable part of the world’s car park. As such, their build is 
significant. It is just necessary to see the limitations of the data clearly.  
 
Secondly, it is only possible to test the frequency of the Lean design assemblies 
with this method – that is, how many unmarked cells there are in each region’s 
fold. The Chi squared contingency test is based on frequencies as a part of a 
greater whole; the magnitudes are not easily incorporated into the comparison. 
Because of this, we will only test whether the production region has any 
significant impact on how often a car will get a “faster than average assembly” 
or “fewer parts than average assembly” result. An interesting enough 
comparison to make, however. 
 
In tables eight and nine we can see the test data and the results. The test data is 
simply a count of how many unmarked cells tables six and seven contain for 
each region, for service times and parts respectively – the count for marked cells 
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is only presented for the sake of easy comparison. For example, The Asian 
region of lower part of table six (consisting of the Honda Accord, the Hyundai 
Sonata, the Nissan Stanza/Bluebird and the Toyota Camry) contains 36 
unmarked (faster than average) cells out of 52 total.  
 
The test is done in the usual way. The null hypothesis of the test is that 
production region and frequency of “Fast” or “Lean” assemblies are unrelated. 
The calculation compares the actual, observed values with the expected values; 
the difference is squared and divided by the expected values. The expected 
values are calculated on the basis of row and column totals of the observed 
values. And in the end we get two values to be compared with the critical value 
– the critical value from the Chi squared tables is in this case 5,991: two degrees 
of freedom and a 95 % confidence interval (a common choice).  
 
And the comparison shows the following: in the case of service times, since 
15,561 is greater than 5,991, we REJECT the null hypothesis that production 
region and frequency of “Fast” assemblies are unrelated, at a 95% confidence 
level. Production region DOES matter. In fact, the results are so strong that they 
hold even on a confidence level of 99,9 % (with a critical value of 13,816). 
 
And to see which region wins the comparison, it is only necessary to look at the 
regional breakdown: the Asian producers have considerably more “fast” 
assemblies than the Europeans and somewhat more than the North Americans. 
In other worlds, the Asian cars use assemblies that are easy to assemble more 
often than all others. A result that is thoroughly supported by the theory, of 
course. If anything, it is only surprising that the Asian advantage was not 
greater than this.  
 
However, the second comparison – the parts count – looks somewhat different. 
The test’s output value is only 3,258. The critical value, of two degrees of 
freedom and a 95 % confidence interval, is still 5,991. In this case, since 3,258 is 
less than 5,991, we must ACCEPT the null hypothesis that production region 
and frequency of  “Lean” assemblies are unrelated, at a 95% confidence level. In 
fact, we can only reject the null hypothesis at an 80 % confidence level (with a 
critical value of 3,219). 
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Table 8. Chi squared test of service time. 
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Table 9. Chi squared test of parts count. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
59 
  
And why is this? Service time being clearly related to related to region, but not 
parts count? An unexpected outcome. In all due probability, the two areas 
should be related, and support each other. For instance, we can remember that 
one of the basic steps in reducing assembly time is “Minimize assembly 
component count”.  
 
Furthermore, if we inspect the regional breakdown again, we see that the Asian 
producers in this case fall behind both the Europeans and the North Americans. 
The North Americans are actually quite overwhelming in this case. Of course, 
since the Chi squared test gave a relatively small significance to the test this 
time, it is possible that this does not mean anything. But it does seem as is the 
Asians are weaker in this comparison.  
 
 
Correlation of service time and parts count 
 
From the results obtained here it is easy to begin to doubt the correlation of the 
two areas of measurement, service times and parts count. If they totally 
unrelated to each other, it will certainly be a complicated task to say which 
region or company produce the Leanest cars, and the whole concept of DFMA 
will be suspicious. Everything points towards that the two areas should be 
closely linked on all counts.  
 
To actually find out which way the issue goes, it is at this point more or less 
necessary to see whether the two data collections show any correlation in their 
breakdown. This is a relatively easy thing to do, with the data in an easily 
comparable format as it is. However, one thing should be done before actually 
calculating: the two data tables still contain a few assembly data points that are 
only present in one of the tables – the cases where for instance service time data 
could be found but no parts count chart.  
 
If we simply delete these, (seat and engine/trans assy. in one case, air cleaner, 
cooling system, instrument panel and center console in the other – see table 
five) the data in tables six and seven is a good basis for calculating the 
correlation. The result, as it turns out is a significantly high, positive correlation: 
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0,505. We can see the same thing if we graph the two data sets against each 
other, total parts count time (the sum of all the chosen assemblies) against the 
total service – see figure nine.  (For a more in depth study of the correlation and 
cohesion of the individual assemblies, also see figure 16. The resulting data 
points are relatively close together, and form a clear line, pointing upwards.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Correlation of Service time and Parts count. 
 
 
This is a good result, showing what we suspected, that parts count and service 
time is indeed highly correlated. What the result also says, however, is that 
there is something else to the equation; that service time does not only depend 
on parts count. The difference between our result and perfect positive 
correlation, one, is also about 0,5. We can assume that it is made up from a 
number of different factors, such as design and material, much in the way we 
saw in the chapter on DFMA.  
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Thus the original question remains. If one chooses to consider the parts count 
frequency test as at least somewhat significant, it is intriguing that the Asian 
producers, which did so well in the service time test, would do poorly in this 
test. And furthermore, that the North American producers would in fact be the 
best in this category. Does this suggest that the American producers are good at 
DFM, while the Asian producers prefer DFA? An interesting thought. It is 
obvious, however, that more in-depth study of the individual cars models is 
necessary.  
4.3. Scatterplots of Lean design – regional cohesion and the Leanest car 
In this section we’ll try to find the answers to the second and third research 
questions: will the cars’ results be so close for different companies in the same 
region that something can be said about the region’s expertise, and what cars 
will in fact come out on top and bottom in the test? This is easiest accomplished 
by visual means, graphing what results we have already produced in the 
former sections. 
 
For instance, to see whether a car is Lean or not, the frequency – of assemblies 
faster to service than average or using less parts than average – is only one 
dimension. The magnitude of the differences is also just as important. So a 
measure of the total magnitude of how much more fast a car is to service or 
how much fewer parts it uses is also necessary. 
 
To do this, there are two readily available possibilities. One can sum up the 
percentage differences from average, or even take the average of the averages – 
or simply calculate the total service time and the total parts count. The former 
method, however, has the drawback that it doesn’t really mean anything 
tangible anymore: a car model may have seats that can be changed 50 percent 
faster than average, and an engine than is 50 percent slower than average. Even 
if the sum total of the averages is zero, the actual service time will still be 
dominated by the slow-to-service engine. Thus it makes sense to use the actual 
service times or parts count as a measure of DFMA magnitude.  
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The aim is of course to have as short a service time total as possible (and the 
same for the parts count total). For the graph to be more intuitively clear, we 
should put the frequency of above average service times and parts count on the 
other axis: this way the Lean “direction” is towards the origin of both axis. The 
result is shown in figures ten and eleven.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Individual results (Service time). 
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Figure 11. Individual results (Parts count). 
 
 
Regional cohesion 
 
Now we can already see some answers to the research questions. The service 
time graph (figure ten) shows us a relatively high degree of regional cohesion. 
Not perfect such, of course, but the cars are generally quite closely grouped into 
three distinct areas. The Asian producers probably lie furthest towards origin, 
but the North Americans are very close. Finally, the Europeans lie farthest 
away, as was expected in accordance with the theory. Again, we are struck by 
the fact that the difference between the Asian and North American producers is 
so small, when all is said and done. The staggering Asian advantage in 
production methods spoken of in “The Machine That Changed the World” seems 
thin in this comparison.  
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But we can note that the Japanese car models are tied very closely to each other: 
their car models are very similar to each other in DFA rating. Interestingly 
enough, the fourth Asian producer, South Korean Hyundai, is an outlier, in the 
even more Lean direction. In comparison, the European and North American 
producers’ values are more individual.  
 
The other graph (figure eleven) showing parts count total and the frequency of 
“crammed” assemblies, on the other hand, does not indicate any particular 
regional cohesion. The car models are if anything spread almost evenly over the 
“Lean line”, from most Lean to least. But, if a distinction has to be made, the 
Asians seem to lie the farthest out, the Americas closest in. At this point we 
should remember the Chi squared –test’s outcome, that there is no statistically 
significant regional trend for parts count, and that the spread between a 
region’s producers is undoubtedly large. But nevertheless, it is interesting to 
speculate over this unusual turn of events. 
 
 
The Leanest car 
 
Now it is possible to say something about the individual successes of the car 
models. The winner of the Lean design “competition” when talking about 
service time is clearly the Hyundai Sonata. Conversely, the Peugeot 405 and 
Saab 900 probably share their place at the far end of the Lean line. The Saab is 
hardly a surprising candidate for this dubious honour, Saab being a generally 
smaller producer than the other – it is not strange that they would have a lower 
focus on DFA than its competitors. Furthermore, the Swedish focus on safety 
issues may or may not be playing its part in inflating the Saab’s service time.  
 
More surprising is the Hyundai Sonata. Not in that it is Asian, but simply 
because it is not Japanese. The story Womack et al. (1990: 261-263) tell about the 
South Koran situation, is mainly based on the launch and production of the 
Hyundai Excel model, which somewhat predates the Sonata (1985-1994). It is 
told by them that sales in the United States of the Excel model fell 50 percent 
between 1988 and 1990, mainly because of the poor quality of the car, and the 
fact that the Korean currency was beginning to strengthen against the dollar in 
1988. The Sonata, must reasonably argued have been much in the same 
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situation. It was, like the Excel, a product of the old production system and was 
to a great degree conceived in collaboration with other companies: it got its 
design done by an Italian designer, and featured a Japanese Mitsubishi engine 
(Cars-directory 2009h).   
 
Because of these facts, the Hyundai Sonata’s victory is remarkable. One can 
only speculate as to the explanation: Possibly, in this case, the car was simple in 
design, and thus easy to assemble, possibly Hyundai was simply well versed in 
the art of DFA. So whether this outcome was a fluke or not, is actually a quite 
important question to this work – are the DFMA and Lean production 
principles more unrelated than we thought? The good overall Asian result says 
no, but still, the suspicion is there.  
 
In the other graph, the parts count figure, the winner is Ford Taurus and the 
loser Honda Accord – unambiguously so. Both results are interesting. If one 
reviews the background of Ford Taurus, however, it is said the focus on design 
in this model (first generation, 1986-1991) was tangible. In fact, Ford Taurus is 
was a very important new product to Ford Motor Company, the car that would 
end the bad streak of  money and market share loss. The goal was to create 
something entirely new –“a "world class" car with styling, engineering, and 
performance equal to or better than any similar sized car” (The Henry Ford 1999). In 
doing this, design engineers, stylists, manufacturing engineers, and marketing 
people were brought together, and the design was created as a complete unit. 
Ford also used benchmarking to identifying competitive cars with the best 
features and trying to create equal or improved versions of them in the Taurus. 
It is also mentioned that “great emphasis was put on design for quality low cost 
manufacturing.” (The Henry Ford 1999.) This very Lean way of acting may well 
account for the Taurus’ overall high score in the comparison, and especially its 
good DFM ranking. 
 
And the Honda Accord? Why would a car produced by one of the world 
leaders in Japanese Lean Production come last in this kind of comparison? 
Again, one can find possible explanations in the model’s history: the fourth 
generation of the model was launched in 1990, and it sported several new 
engineering features. It came with a new electronic fuel injected engine, an all 
aluminium power train, an electronically controlled rear engine mount to 
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reduce low frequency noise and vibration (Cars-directory 2009c). Their 
suspension and steering systems may well have been added to in the same run, 
drawing down the overall DFM value. This is in fact a train of thought that 
would deserve some thought in future research – do later, updated versions of 
the same car exhibit lower results in DFA and DFM because of the additions? 
 
To make comparison a bit more easy, a rough ranking list can be made from the 
scatterplots – ranking those that come the closest to origin as best (most Lean). 
This will be a very unscientific ranking in that that several of the car’s results 
are very close to each other. However, if the attempt is made, it gets easier to 
see if there is any overlap in the two fields.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Internal ranking of cars. 
 
 
For instance, Ford Taurus is a strong candidate in both rankings, ultimately 
making it the Leanest car in this work. Saab 900 is at the other end of the 
spectrum, pretty much. Among the Asian cars, Hyundai Sonata and Toyota 
Camry get relatively strong results both times. There are no candidates that 
would be entirely in different ends of the rankings, even if in most cases, there 
are a few places difference between a models place in respective list. In any 
case, the results of the analysis as a whole are not exactly what one would 
 Service time   Parts count 
      
1. ASIA.   Hyundai Sonata GL 1. USA.    Ford Taurus L 
2. USA.    Ford Taurus L 2. EURO.  Audi 80 2.0E 
3. USA.    Dodge Spirit 3. USA.    Buick Skylark Ltd 
4. EURO. Volkswagen Passat GL 4. ASIA.   Toyota Camry 
5. ASIA.   Toyota Camry 5. ASIA.   Hyundai Sonata GL 
6. ASIA.   Nissan Stanza/Bluebird XE 6. USA.    Dodge Spirit 
7. ASIA.   Honda Accord DX 7. ASIA.   Nissan Stanza/Bluebird XE 
8. USA.    Chevrolet Corsica LT 8. EURO.  Peugeot 405 Mi16 
9. USA.    Buick Skylark Ltd 9. EURO.  Volkswagen Passat GL 
10. EURO.  Audi 80 2.0E 10. EURO.  Saab 900 
11. EURO.  Saab 900 11. USA.    Chevrolet Corsica LT 
12. EURO.  Peugeot 405 Mi16 12. ASIA.   Honda Accord DX 
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expect.  If we try and explain the parts count numbers with individual design 
reasons, why would then the service times exhibit a much greater degree of 
regional cohesion? Should also the service time numbers be explained 
individually? 
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5. DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
So let us look at some possible reasons why our results would turn out this 
way. The Asian car producers turned out to be the best at Design for Assembly, 
but not overwhelmingly so. The American producers were possibly best at 
Design for Manufacture, but the results were too weak to say anything definite 
about regional success. It nevertheless looked as if the Asian producers were 
much weaker in this category. Mainly it seemed that the result were highly 
individual in the DFM section, while reasonably regional in the DFA. 
 
An important finding here is the fact that the Asian and especially the Japanese 
producers did not achieve an overwhelming victory in this analysis. According 
to for instance the survey carried out by the MIT International Motor Vehicle 
Program, the Japanese automakers have an edge in manufacturability, much in 
the same way that they excel at production performances. If we again study 
that survey data (see figure two) we see that Toyota, Honda and Nissan are 
first, second and fifth, respectively. The European producers trail at the end, 
Ford is the highest ranking of the North American producers.  
 
This is at odds with the rankings in table ten – not necessarily to any significant 
degree, but nevertheless. Unless we choose to reject the indications of the IMVP 
survey, the discrepancy should probably be sought elsewhere. There are, in 
fact, at least three different possibilities why our results should differ the way 
they do.  
 
Firstly – it is possible that there is a more substantial difference between the two 
areas of Lean design, DFM and DFA than previously suspected. The collective 
term DFMA may be misleading – if automobile producers treat the two 
methods as separate, distinct processes the outcome may well be something like 
the results we saw in this analysis. If automakers furthermore value DFA 
higher, and focus more on throughput and production figures rather than 
material cost, the outcome would probably be greater regularity and regional 
cohesion of the service time data, much like what we saw here. There is nothing 
that specifically speaks against this hypothesis. This could very well be the case 
– only a more in depth study of the individual producer companies could 
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possibly give the answer. However, since there is no specific evidence either 
way, so far, it is best to leave the decision undone.  
 
Secondly – the possibility that Lean Production and DFMA are not as 
thoroughly related as one might think. The data that that forms the basis of this 
analysis is probably quite suitable for ascertaining the DFMA level of a car 
model: that is why it was chosen in the first place. However, there is nothing 
that says that a company that truly excels in Lean production methods (such as 
Toyota) need be more than just good at DFMA. The two principles aim towards 
the same goal, but there is not necessarily any causality or cohesion between the 
two. It would just seem probable that this is the case. Probable is not the same 
thing as definite, though.  
 
Personally, I am going to assume the third reason: inconclusive data. As stated 
earlier on, a data analysis based on twelve vehicles only, will not really be able 
to say anything certain about a region’s output, nor really anything about a 
company’s extended production. What the Chi squared analysis showed was 
the success of these Asian, American and European cars, and the fact that 
individual design successes stand out so pointedly (e.g. the Ford Taurus) only 
goes to show that a sufficiently large statistical database has not been 
established. As we could see, the correlation between the two design methods 
DFM and DFA was high, but not a hundred percent. My guess is that the 
individual car models in this case displayed large discrepancies between the 
two methods simply because of reasons unrelated to this analysis, i.e. model 
development stage, the trade-off between simplicity of design and model 
quality, etc. This sort of variation could only be reduced by increasing the 
sample size.    
 
Furthermore, this data analysis was, of course, a point sample: one year only, 
and only one type of car presented. The automakers ranking their competitors 
have most probably seen a wide spectrum of cars over along period of time, 
allowing them to focus on the trend rather than the year’s crop. This would 
certainly smooth out wilder peaks and slumps in a company’s production. 
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Further study 
 
The logical next step, then?  To broaden the scope of the data basis, over several 
years and more models, probably. That might enable the analysis to see what 
the automakers of the IMVP survey saw, or if not, provide a more secure basis 
to make contradictory assumptions from. If the outcome still shows 
discrepancies with the survey data, then it may start to make sense to doubt the 
survey instead of objective data – perhaps there are things of interest to be 
found in the discrepancies.  
 
And how will this best be achieved? The only way to expand the year 1990 
database is to allow other body types and layouts into the comparison, since the 
sedan, family model comparison was already exhausted in this work. The 
different models will not be directly comparable to each other, but the Chi 
squared type analysis of how often a specific car model has displayed “above 
average” or “below average” results should be possible to perform on an 
extended model database too. The economy car class has several different 
possible subsets, based on door layout and motor size, the family car class 
could be augmented by a station wagon class and a separate section for sports 
car or luxury cars could also be a possibility.  
 
To broaden the spectrum over further years simply means gathering more 
Michell International Collision Estimating guides and repeating the process. To 
move forwards in time would give the possibility to see whether the different 
production regions have really started to converge in their design practises, and 
whether the Asian automakers have been able to keep their grip on the lead 
position. A sample point close to our time, and possibly one in between, would 
already mean a much clearer picture of what has been happening since the time 
of The Machine.  
 
 
  
71 
6.  CONCLUSION  
 
In conclusion, it can only be said that the data analysis produced good results, 
but with a somewhat counter-intuitive twist at the end, that makes it necessary 
for the study to continue.  
 
The original point of interest was to answer whether Asian cars really are 
Leaner in design, and whether the selected cars’ results would be so close that 
something can be said about the region’s expertise. And, of course, to see what 
cars would come out on top and bottom in the test. These questions were 
answered, yes, but what does it all mean? The answers, respectively, would be: 
only in the DFA section, only in DFA section, top: Hyundai Sonata and Ford Taurus, 
bottom: Saab 900 and Honda Accord. We tested the significance of production 
region on the usage of “Leaner” assemblies in car models and got the answer 
that there is a significant impact on service times. On parts count, there is 
probably not. Furthermore, we saw that there is a relatively good degree of 
regional cohesion in the test results on service times – but not in the parts 
counts’.  
 
Interestingly enough, at least three of the car models that either “won” or “lost” 
the comparison are – if not unexpected – than at least contrary to the theoretical 
assumptions that we made in the beginning of the study. The supremacy of 
traditional production methods in producing the fast service Hyundai Sonata is 
one example, and the failure of the Lean production system in producing the 
crammed parts Honda Accord is another.  
 
The theory, based to a high degree on the findings of the MIT International 
Motor Vehicle Programme, indicates the Asian and especially Japanese strength 
in Lean production methods: the system originated there, and spread from 
there – logically the Japanese are well versed in the principles of Lean. Less 
clear, but nevertheless quite convincing, is the linkage between Lean 
production and Design for Manufacture and Assembly. One is not the offshoot 
of the other, but the two principles aim in the same direction: a Leaner design of 
the car. Linking these two areas of thought is a logical step. However, the 
results seem to show a (slight) discrepancy between the two. It does not seem 
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necessary for a Lean producer to be completely successful in the DFMA 
analysis.  
 
There are, of course, several differing explanations as to why the outcome of the 
analysis would turn out the way it actually did – a separation of DFM and DFA, 
for instance, or that the cars’ results despite the Chi squared analysis can be 
considered to be individual, not regional. It is clear that if some models were 
able to stand out as pointedly as they did, mainly because of individual merits, 
the data sample should be expanded. This should serve to give us a clearer 
view of why and how the Asian producers have earned their reputation as the 
most Lean designers, or at least create a more stable basis to make other 
assumptions from.  
 
As for the significance of Lean Design and DFMA to the greater picture –
consider the figures presented by Holweg and Pil (2004: 52) in summing up the 
development of the auto industry since 1990. The number of Japanese labour 
hours per vehicle was – in 1998 – 16,8 hours. This was more than thirty percent 
less than North America’s 24,9 hours and more than fifty percent less than 
Europe’s 35,5. The interesting thing, though, is that a decade later, in 2000, the 
Japanese productivity was still more than 25 % better than the North American 
and 35% better than the European (at 12,3 h, 16,8 h and 28,0 h respectively).  
 
And the reason? Continuous improvement and sensible solutions such as Lean 
Design and DFMA. Implementing small improvements that cumulate over time 
to form an unmatched level of quality and production efficiency. Cost 
reductions that chip away at the greater costs, leaving small but significant 
contribution to the overall picture – and in the end, competitors are left 
standing, wondering where their market share went. Logically these kind 
improvements formed the basis of Asia’s strong track record in automobile 
production,  
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True, over the last two decades, there has been considerable convergence, 
happening, and the auto industry around the world now stand much closer to 
each other in terms of production practises. It should be noted, however, that 
much of this improvement, has happened through import of lean principles: as 
Holweg and Pil (2004: 51) somewhat dryly put it: 
 
 “Ford launched its Ford Production System; Lee Iacocca at Chrysler renamed 
lean production “agile manufacturing”, and Mercedes-Benz and Volkdswagen 
translated kaizen as kontinuierlicher Verbesserungsprozess (KVP). Regardless of 
the name, the central tenets of Toyota’s practises became the focus of 
improvement, at most major car producers.” 
 
At the writing moment, the global recession is just gearing up, and it is treating 
all automakers harshly. Car sales have sunk by 41 percent since last year’s 
February, with individual results of major producers varying from about 35 
percent to 53 (GM taking the dubious place at the top). Seeing how this is being 
quoted as the worst industry sales situation in 40 years, this means that none of 
the worlds auto companies stand unaffected. (Welch & Kiley 2009.) In addition, 
the automotive industry as a whole now stands in front of a revolution of kind: 
perhaps the true advent of a new kind of car – energy efficiency, electricity, and 
hybrid technology being the name of the game. Perhaps now will even be the 
time when the true customer order car system will finally be implemented too, 
after almost thirty years of discussion (Holweg & Pil 2004). Now is the time for 
all auto companies to look over their deck and shuffle out all practises that do 
not fit the new way.  
 
But the best thing about Lean practises such as Lean Design and DFMA, is that 
they are viable tools in whatever the car companies finally choose to do. They 
need not be discarded, since they will continue to make sense, regardless. They 
will not make a company a giant in a day, but they may well be the thing that 
makes a company a giant over time. They may well be the thing that makes or 
breaks a company in the long run of things, and they may well mean the 
difference between profit and loss when the times get tough. Whatever the 
future is about to bring, be it tank trucks or electrical go-carts, hovercraft or 
horse carriges, customer order or mass production – Lean design and DFMA 
will simply be there to make it better. The brave new world of the tomorrow 
will stand on the back of the DFMA of today – and that’s a fact.  
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APPENDIX 1. Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. The timeline of Lean Production evolution (Holweg 2007: 434). 
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Figure 13. Excerpt from a Collision estimating guide (1) (Collision Estimating 
Guide – Imported 1991: 1063). 
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Figure 14. Excerpt from a Collision estimating guide (2) (Collision Estimating 
Guide – Imported 1991: 1068). 
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Figure 15. Excerpt from a Collision estimating guide (3) (Collision Estimating 
Guide – Imported 1991: 1066).
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Figure 16. Correlation and cohesion of individual assemblies. 
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